Kwankwaso's Hidden Agenda

By Comrade Umoru Ibrahim

A lot is being said and speculated across Northern Nigeria regarding the real motive behind Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso’s growing political relationship with Peter Obi.
Many political observers remain puzzled by what appears to be a sudden and dramatic shift in Kwankwaso’s posture toward the former Labour Party presidential candidate.

Previously, Kwankwaso had openly portrayed Peter Obi as a politician with political and intellectual credentials inferior to his own. On that basis, he argued that accepting a subordinate position under Obi would not only be politically abnormal but entirely unacceptable.

His public disposition then suggested that he considered himself politically senior and electorally more relevant, particularly in the Northern political landscape.

What, therefore, explains this apparent change of heart?

Today, Kwankwaso has not only swallowed, hook, line, and sinker, the very proposal he once rejected, but has also increasingly positioned himself as one of Obi’s most visible political defenders and strategic allies.

To many unsuspecting members of the public, this development may appear to be motivated by patriotism and a sincere desire for national unity.

However, a deeper political analysis suggests that Kwankwaso’s calculations may be driven more by long-term personal ambition than by national interest.

In my opinion, two major considerations lie behind Kwankwaso’s current political maneuvering.

First, there appears to be a deliberate attempt to frustrate Atiku Abubakar’s presidential ambition by weakening his Northern political base ahead of the 2027 presidential election. Kwankwaso understands that Atiku’s greatest electoral strength historically comes from the North. By aligning himself with Obi and mobilizing a segment of Northern voters away from Atiku, Kwankwaso may be seeking to diminish Atiku’s dominance and complicate his path to victory.

Second, Kwankwaso seems eager to create the impression among Southerners that he played a decisive role in sustaining the principle of power rotation and zoning the presidency to the South in 2027. Such a political image could become a strategic asset for his own presidential ambition in 2031.

By presenting himself as a Northern statesman who supported Southern aspirations, he may hope to earn goodwill and reciprocal political support when it becomes his turn to pursue the presidency again.

Indeed, if there are two individuals Kwankwaso would least like to see occupying Aso Rock in 2027, they are Peter Obi and Atiku Abubakar.

The reason is straightforward: the successful emergence of either of the two could significantly weaken or permanently extinguish Kwankwaso’s future presidential ambitions.

An Obi presidency may consolidate a new political movement capable of reshaping opposition politics, while an Atiku presidency could further entrench his political influence in Northern establishment, leaving little room for Kwankwaso’s national aspirations.

Ironically, from a purely strategic standpoint, Kwankwaso may even prefer the continuity of Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s administration over the victory of either Obi or Atiku. Such an outcome could preserve the political vacuum and uncertainty upon which his future ambitions depend.

This is why those who describe Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso as a subtle political actor indirectly advancing Tinubu’s interests may not be entirely mistaken.

Whether that perception is fair or exaggerated remains open to debate, but one thing is certain: Nigerian politics is rarely driven by sentiment alone. Beneath every alliance often lies a deeper calculation shaped by ambition, survival, and the pursuit of future power.